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Introduction  
Taiwan lacks widespread diplomatic recognition, membership of international organisations 
and its participation in international society frequently depends on China’s goodwill (Winkler, 
2013). The fact and extent of Taiwan’s marginalization is incongruous given its status as a 
liberal democracy, major world economy and trading power. It enjoys informal social and 
economic relations with many countries, but its lack of access to formal international 
interactions is unlikely to change in the short-term due to the PRC’s intractable position on 
‘one China’ and the lack of support in Taiwan for acceding to Beijing’s conditions for reducing 
its efforts to isolate Taiwan (Glaser, 2013). Within this context, Beijing and Taipei have 
attempted to communicate their respective positions to the world via public diplomacy 
programs and externally-facing media. With its strong desire to change the status quo of 
Taiwan’s functional autonomy Beijing has leveraged its superior economic and diplomatic 
resources in an omnilateral offensive to establish the ‘correct’ understanding of Taiwan’s status 
as an inviolable part of one China. Taipei for its part has responded with a low-key public 
diplomacy program of its own with mixed results (Rawnsley, 2017). The impasse in the Taiwan 
Strait, which involves the national, strategic and geopolitical interests of the world’s two major 
powers China and the US, will not be solved by external public communications, but these 
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efforts are significant nonetheless. ‘Soft power’, the ability to secure support for preferred 
outcomes based on attraction rather than coercion, is predicated on generating attention (Nye, 
2004): Attractive properties must be known and acknowledged as such to have an effect. This 
being the case, a further component of the international communications environment also 
demands our attention, foreign media coverage. Narratives delivered by foreign media have 
superior reach in their domestic contexts than national public diplomacy programs have among 
foreign audiences. Despite the potentially distorting, negating, or magnifying effects on 
national external communication efforts, foreign media coverage has been overlooked in 
studies on Taiwan’s public diplomacy. Indeed, no prior academic study has sought to assess 
western media coverage of Taiwan in a systematic way. This gap is important. Given Taiwan’s 
marginalization and China’s efforts to determine global perceptions of Taiwan, it matters how 
foreign media frame Taiwan to their national audiences, which include voters and policymakers. 
For Beijing and Taipei, it matters how publics around the world perceive their different 
positions on Taiwan’s status. For Taipei it is especially important, because Beijing has 
successfully used economic and diplomatic means to dictate how international institutions and 
the majority of national governments treat Taiwan. Drawing on interview data with western 
journalists and a substantial sample of western news media reports on Taiwan, this article 
employs a mix of quantitative and qualitative text analytical methods to identify how a global 
narrative about democratic Taiwan has been constructed in the last 20 years. The article 
concludes with discussion of the implications of media treatment for public diplomacy and 
‘soft power’ efforts.       
 
Why Foreign Media Coverage Matters 
In information environments characterized by ‘hyper-mediation’ and ‘communicative 
abundance’ (Chadwick, 2013; Keane, 2013), such as the ones that prevail in most advanced 
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economies, ‘geopolitics saturates everyday life’ (Tuathail and Dalby, 1998: 5). For publics this 
saturation is delivered second-hand by the ‘low’ or ‘popular’ means of the media and internet. 
Only a small number of elites can experience the formal aspects of geopolitics manifest in 
statecraft, diplomacy, and international organizations. A large body of research suggests that 
exposure to media reporting on foreign affairs can ‘substantially affect the audience’s 
knowledge, perception, and attitude toward other nations’ (Hanitzsch et al., 2013: 171). 
Building on the seminal work of McCombs and Shaw (1972), research on agenda-setting found 
that media coverage gave audiences clues about the salience of world events, with more 
abundant coverage increasing the perceived importance in viewers’ minds (Soroka, 2003). 
More recent studies have identified a ‘second-level’ agenda-setting effect where the ways in 
which the media cover an issue influence the way audiences perceive it (Wanta et al., 2004). 
By providing audiences with an ‘attribute agenda’, studies have shown ‘a clear relationship 
between media coverage of nations and how individuals viewed those nations’ (Wanta et al., 
2004: 372). The significance of these findings has increased as ‘softer’ forms of power 
embodied in a favourable national image and reputation have gained importance as foreign 
policy goals (Gilboa, 2008: 56). Foreign media are an important mechanism in the construction 
and propagation of a nation’s image or brand, a concern that is no longer restricted to 
corporations (Anholt, 2005). As Zhang argues, ‘the news media act as referees for the 
credibility or legitimacy of soft power resources and as important instruments for branding the 
nation in public diplomacy’ (2010: 234).  
 Evidence of foreign news influencing policymakers is less unanimous, but is also 
suggestive of exposure effects. The first Gulf War marked the emergence of global media as a 
significant actor in international affairs (Gilboa, 2008), specifically the popularization of 
Atlanta-based Cable News Network, which prompted discussion of a ‘CNN Effect’ (Gilboa, 
2005). The so-called ‘CNN effect’ was thought to facilitate instantaneous communication 
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between state administrations and influence leaders to change or enact policies (Robinson, 
2011: 3). Numerous accounts appeared in support of international news reporting influencing 
American leaders to intervene in Somalia, Northern Iraq and Kosovo (Bahador, 2007). On 
balance, the evidence for a ‘CNN effect’ is ambiguous, but the possibility that foreign news 
may affect publics and policymakers increases the significance of decisions taken by journalists, 
editors and news organizations in their construction of coverage of other countries. These 
actors have the power to determine how a country is framed and the kind of information that 
audiences receive. Furthermore, since audiences in most countries are uniformed about foreign 
news relative to domestic affairs, media actors’ decisions increase in significance. With any 
given story there is substantial scope for news professionals to choose which issues to cover 
and how to present them. In terms of foreign news, editors have an important role in 
establishing which countries are ‘important’ (Willnat and Martin, 2012), while correspondents 
act as crucial intermediaries sourcing and sorting information from foreign locations (Zhang 
and Zhang, 2017). Research on foreign correspondents shows multiple influences on how they 
do their work, from individual preferences and background to work routines and the culture 
and organization of their news outlet (Archetti, 2010). While individual journalists have agency 
in the production of their reporting, they work within a profession which imposes numerous 
structural and normative constraints (Hess, 2005). The resources available for foreign new 
gathering and reporting has declined as media organizations implement cost-cutting measures 
in response to declining readership and challenges to their business models (Archetti, 2013). 
With the popularization of digital formats, the increasing speed of the news cycle, fragmented 
audiences and increased competition for ratings, readers and clicks in service of driving 
advertising revenues, have led to soft infotainment, sensationalism and the endless recycling 
inherent in ‘churnalism’ (Jackson and Moloney, 2016). 
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Media Coverage Biases 
A substantial body of research shows that the media’s determination of what is newsworthy is 
prone to negativity bias. Put bluntly, bad news sells. Media overemphasize the prevalence of 
violent crime (Altheide, 1997) and events involving conflict receive more media attention 
(Shoemaker et al., 1991). Soroka’s (2014) analysis of crime news coverage and actual crime 
rates in the US shows an obvious negativity bias at work—crime stories are more frequently 
reported than the crime rate would suggest, with a tendency to exaggerate the frequency of 
violent crime, and to give more space in accordance with the degree of violence. Soroka found 
a similar dynamic at work with coverage of the economy in US, UK and Canadian newspapers: 
Overall one mildly negative piece of economic news produces on average two news stories, 
while to get one story in the paper two pieces of similarly positive information must come out 
(2014: 91). This focus on negativity is consequential. Altheide (1997), for instance, showed 
how TV news presented using the ‘problem frame’ highlighting distress and suffering can lead 
to erroneous impressions among viewers about real levels of danger and violence. Combined 
with media fascination with personality, human interest storylines and personal drama, Keane 
argues that ‘the adversarial and “gotcha” styles of commercial journalism’ make the world 
seem worse than it is and reduce public trust in politicians and institutions (2013: 41).  
The choice to focus on ‘bad news’ is intuitive, and does not imply anything wrong with 
journalistic practice. For instance, there is no reason, and would be no audience, for reporting 
on the thousands of airplanes that land safely every day. However, journalists also have the 
power to determine how events are framed, i.e. the selective emphasis and de-emphasis of 
elements in a story used to promote a particular interpretation (Entman, 2004). Examples of 
media framing abound. Entman cites the example of American news coverage of the downing 
of a Korean Airlines plane over the Soviet Union in 1983, which ‘universally portrayed the 
incident as a “brutal” act of murder by an evil communist power’ (2008: 92). By contrast, when 
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the American Navy shot down a civilian Iranian plane US media focused on technical details 
as the ‘act was dissonant with American self-images as a humane power occupying a wholly 
different moral universe from the heartless Soviet empire’ (Entman, 2008: 93). Gans’s (1979) 
study of American news media argued that American journalists and editors aligned their 
coverage of foreign events with American foreign policy. The idea that beyond considerations 
of newsworthiness, news media were inclined to serve national interest in their coverage of 
foreign affairs stimulated a critical ‘popular geopolitics’ approach that explicitly seeks to 
‘expose the inherent power relationships attached to global knowledge’ (McFarlane and Hay, 
2003: 212).  
Geo-politics is ‘a discourse and a practice engaging in the creation of geographical 
relationships and orders so that global space becomes divided into simplistic categories such 
as good/evil, threatening/safe, civilized/barbaric’ (Dittmer and Dodds, 2008: 441). Rooted in 
this discourse and practice, popular geo-politics seeks to provide a theoretical account of how 
mass media and other popular cultural forms communicate global politics to their audiences. It 
is distinguished by a focus on ‘everyday discourse and role of the media in the construction 
and perpetuation of dominant geopolitical understandings of events, people and places’ 
(McFarlane and Hay, 2003: 213). Popular geopolitical discourses, or ‘tabloid geopolitics’ 
(Debrix, 2007), employ straightforward explanatory frameworks providing links between 
issues in ‘exotic’ locales, ‘Other’ people and audience concerns. In the hands of international 
media concerned with ‘the big picture of power and danger within world politics’ (Dittmer and 
Dodds, 2008: 438), popular geopolitical framings provide black and white simplicity, is crisis 
and conflict driven and routinely indulges in future oriented speculation. Media narratives 
provide ‘context within which elite geopolitical texts are (re-)produced’ (Sharp, 1993: 491), 
generating meanings and realities for audience consumption, shaping their ‘geopolitical 
imaginaries in both the domestic and international realm’ (Mawdsley, 2008: 516). The media 
7 
 
likewise ‘supply and entrench interpretive frameworks through which the political world is 
rendered comprehensible’ (McFarlane and Hay, 2003: 213), facilitating the definition and 
understanding of complex phenomena as ‘controllable geopolitical abstractions’ (Tuathail and 
Agnew, 1992: 195). Such is the routinized (re-)production of ‘established geopolitical images, 
metaphors and assumptions’, which they can become entrenched conventional wisdom 
(McFarlane and Hay, 2003: 214).  
 
Research Design 
The fundamental question we are interested in is how foreign media cover Taiwan. We identify 
‘foreign media’ as those who operate outside Taiwan and do not have Taiwanese as their 
intended audience. We distinguish between ‘foreign media’ and ‘global media’, such as CNN 
International and BBC World, which broadcast to a non-specific global audience. In order to 
circumscribe ‘foreign media’ to a manageable category, we focus first on media serving 
audiences in English-speaking countries and English language media in non-native speaking 
countries like Japan and Malaysia. We then concentrate on American newspapers. These 
decisions were prompted by the pre-eminence of English language media globally and the 
status of the US as Taiwan’s most important ‘friend’ and thus American voters and 
policymakers as Taiwan’s most important foreign audience. Our empirical strategy is 
composed of three parts: interviews with news professionals, analysis of 20 years’ worth of 
newspaper reports, and modelling of coverage and a selection of contextual covariates. First, 
we used a set of news media reports on Taiwan to identify journalists who had written or 
broadcast stories about Taiwan in the past five years and sent them an open-ended 
questionnaire. Of the 48 invitations we sent, 26 journalists and editors responded. We don’t 
claim that this sample is representative of all journalists and editors, but maintain that it is a 
sufficiently large cohort to derive useful insights from. Second, to assess coverage of Taiwan 
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in a systematic way we need to examine a sufficiently large sample drawn from an extended 
period. One empirical source that is available and directly comparable over a suitable 
timeframe is newspapers. To obtain materials for analysis, we used the Nexis repository to 
compile a dataset of major English language newspaper reports about Taiwan during the past 
twenty years. Our selection of 65 outlets includes respected broadsheets like the Los Angeles 
Times, Sydney Morning Herald and Globe and Mail, and popular or tabloid publications like 
the Daily Mirror, The Sun and USA Today. It includes outlets from across the political spectrum, 
from The Australian, Daily Mail, and Telegraph on the right to the New York Daily News and 
The Guardian towards the left. We searched for articles containing ‘Taiwan’ in the headline 
published between January 1st 1996 and June 30th 2016, the twenty-year period that covers 
what is generally known as ‘democratic Taiwan’.1 The document set includes 18433 articles. 
Through a close reading of a sub-sample of reports we identified a battery of salient markers 
and applied these across the entire data set to provide estimates of the prevalence of frame 
indicators across time. 
Third, we constructed a sub-set of newspaper reports on Taiwan from the New York 
Times and Washington Post. Unlike the full set of 65 newspaper outlets which include 
numerous types of newspaper (and audience demographics), the New York Times and 
Washington Post are American broadsheets serving an elite audience. The ‘gatekeeping’ and 
‘agenda-setting’ function of these elite outlets in the US (Graber and Dunaway, 2014) 
continues to exert influence even in the digital age (Meraz, 2009). We suspect that the 
construction of foreign news in these newspapers targeting elite audiences may have the scope 
for greater nuance, which we test systematically through statistical modelling, combining 
                                                          
1 In choosing to focus on ‘headline articles’ we acknowledge the possibility of introducing biases- headline articles 
might focus on certain kinds of event for example, or stories about Taiwan might appear under different headlines. 
To check against this possibility, we compiled a sub-sample of 200 stories with Taiwan in the article but not in 
the title. In each case, Taiwan was not the major focus of the article, and in some cases, it was referenced obliquely 
or was listed as an example alongside many other economies. We thus have confidence that headline articles 
represent the most suitable corpus of text for analysis. 
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textual data with a battery of contextual variables relating to the political and economic 
situation in Taiwan across time (Lee, 2015).  Our subset of 1395 reports in the New York Times 
and Washington Post represents all headline articles on Taiwan in both newspapers from Jan 
1st 1999 to Dec 31st 2016 (the period for which a consistent record of both publications was 
available). We formatted and uploaded the document subset into computer-assisted content 
analysis software and developed a dictionary of terms to apply across the document set. 
Specifically, we used the Yoshikoder software developed by Will Lowe and first reported in 
the context of Chinese language material in Sullivan and Lowe (2011). Since any one word can 
be an unreliable indicator of a complex concept, we designed a ‘dictionary’ (or battery of 
individual indicators) for the concepts ‘tension’, ‘co-operation’, ‘status quo’, ‘one China’, 
‘independence’ in addition to indicators of reporting about the economy and democracy. The 
pre-defined dictionary approach using Yoshikoder has previously been employed in studies of 
PRC newspaper reports and Taiwanese presidential speeches (Sullivan and Renz, 2010; 
Sullivan and Sapir, 2012). 
 
Insights from News Professionals 
Insights from these media practitioners reveal several factors contributing to the way foreign 
media outlets cover Taiwan. The first issue concerns news priorities. Given that the media are 
involved in ‘culling and crafting countless bits of information into the limited number of 
messages that reach people every day’ (Shoemaker and Vos, 2009: 1), there is a necessary 
selectivity, and in a volatile world Taiwan is for the most part a beacon of stability. One 
journalist summed it up, reporting that ‘it's very hard to get Taiwan onto the news agenda.’ The 
reality is that ‘Taiwan is not really a priority for any news desk’. Furthermore, ‘newsworthy’ 
stories in the Taiwan context tend to relate to cross-Strait relations because this is where the 
potential for conflict lies. As one journalist admits ‘the dominant story is still geopolitical and 
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rarely about Taiwan in and of itself’. Several respondents noted on the part of their editors ‘an 
eternal desire to have stories that focus on cross-strait issues’. This influences the kind of stories 
that journalists are assigned to write about, and influences the kind of stories that authors pitch, 
especially freelancers who depend on stories being accepted for their livelihood. At least most 
journalists reported having substantial leeway in how they compose their stories with freedom 
to ‘to figure out how I want to frame it’ and ‘the focus/angle/tone of the piece’. Although Others 
commented that ‘there's a lot of moving parts here, including the actual subject of the article, 
the editor I'm dealing with and the publication that runs the article. It's always a bit different -
- sometimes an article gets published as I wrote it, while other times editors step in and make 
changes with nothing I can really do about it’. This may include ‘conventions largely adopted 
by the editors’ relating to the ‘normal diplomatic lexicon’. The major issue is ‘to not call 
Taiwan a country, which is a correctable error per the style guide’. 
A second issue is the effect of financial cuts that have decimated news organizations 
across the sector. Media outlets have cut back on the number of dedicated Taiwan 
correspondents, and indeed most of our respondents were based outside of Taiwan, or were 
working in Taiwan on their own without support. The upshot of financial circumscriptions is 
that news organizations must prioritize and marshal resources accordingly, with the result that 
‘most international media do not have a presence in Taiwan’. As one journalist put it, ‘Taiwan's 
marginalisation in terms of international news value has eaten away at the number of journalists 
working for foreign outlets (and particularly experienced and ambitious journalists), thereby 
degrading the scope, quality and contextual value of news coverage’. On this point, nearly all 
the journalists evinced frustration, commenting on the difficulties of reporting on Taiwan from 
China, or the lack of resources for reporting from the ground in Taiwan. Among the few 
Taiwan-based respondents in our sample, the lack of specialist correspondents was a source of 
frustration, with comments on the ‘marked lack of knowledge about Taiwan’ and ‘sporadic 
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instances of focused interest’. One journalist reflected how ‘some of us in the industry use the 
pejorative “parachute” to describe journalists who fly in and out of Taiwan to cover a specific 
event but then make substantial errors or omissions in their coverage’. Another suggested that 
‘the problems of “writing from Beijing” by people with only mainland China experience was 
laid bare during the Trump-Tsai call coverage’. One journalist noted how ‘a lack of 
understanding of the political history of relations between [Taiwan and China] and the coloured 
political terminology in frequent use, and Taiwan coverage quickly proves vulnerable to 
political skewing and an Orientalist arrogance’. 
A third factor affecting coverage is the lack of space or audience demand for detailed 
explanations of the complexities and nuances of Taiwan’s situation. Several journalists 
explained that their writing on Taiwan for an international audience assumed low levels of prior 
knowledge, to the extent that even basic facts have to be covered. As one reporter put it, ‘I'm 
always assuming that I'm writing for someone who may not know the difference between 
Taiwan and Thailand’. Several respondents noted that their copy ‘always requires the usual 
boilerplate descriptions about Taiwan’. These requirements make it ‘difficult to write a story 
that gets into all the important details when you have space limits and most likely need to spend 
a paragraph or two just explaining what Taiwan is’. Combined with ‘the usual caveats that 
must go into the story about Taiwan's political/diplomatic situation vis a vis China and the US’, 
there is simply not much space left to provide nuanced analysis. Due to multiple structural 
constraints, journalists writing about Taiwan have a difficult job. And several respondents 
noted that their task was not made any easier by the Taiwanese government. Among the 
reported difficulties are that the ‘press office doesn't make it easy for the international media 
to have access to information or spokespeople’, ‘military and naval access is hard’ and 
‘[President] Tsai will not give interviews’. There were also questions about access to press 
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passes and visas for freelance journalists, although many respondents noted that Taiwan is 
generally a good place to access information.  
Despite the lack of permanent, specialist, Taiwan-based correspondents, and a general 
lack of interest and space for stories on Taiwan, respondents do perceive improvement and 
opportunities. Several reporters noted that ‘although a lot of the same tired Taiwan tropes still 
get repeated, the quality of coverage has generally improved’. Another journalist remarked that 
‘there will always be more interest in China, but I do think there is pent-up demand for 
compelling articles from Taiwan’. Yet another reflected that ‘I think there is growing cultural 
interest in Taiwan and the ability for more “soft” stories as more people visit Taiwan’. The 
recent success of ‘progressive Taiwan’ stories relating to LGBT and lifestyle issues, and 
‘quirky things’ in the vein of ‘weird Asia stories’ may serve to increase knowledge and interest 
in Taiwan, and to humanize and demystify a society that often flies under the radar globally. 
One space where stories relating to Taiwan’s ‘progressive’ society have flourished is in online 
media, which do not operate under the same circumscriptions as print or broadcast.  
 
English-Language Newspaper Coverage of Democratic Taiwan 
As intimated by our journalist respondents above, when it comes to coverage by foreign news 
media some countries are more ‘newsworthy’ and demand greater coverage than others. As 
demonstrated by Chang (1998), powerful ‘core’ nations consistently receive coverage from 
U.S. news media, while small ‘peripheral’ nations remain largely uncovered except in extreme 
(usually disastrous) circumstances. The good news for Taiwan is that our document set shows 
that foreign media newspaper coverage of Taiwan during the past 20 years is substantial. 
Headline stories on Taiwan in 65 major English language newspapers generated more than 
eighteen thousand articles. By comparison, using the same search parameters, South Korea, a 
country with similar characteristics, garnered one third less attention than Taiwan. On average, 
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Taiwan has generated around 900 articles per year over the past two decades (see Figure 1). 
Foreign media interest in Taiwan increases in presidential election years, notably in 1996, the 
first direct presidential election, and 2000, when the DPP’s surprise victory led to almost 
double the average number of articles per year. However, these election year spikes mask an 
overall decrease in attention to Taiwan, with a notable decline starting a year into Ma Ying-
jeou’s first administration. As we will show, one of the foreign media’s main interests in 
Taiwan is the capacity for tension, crisis or conflict with China, the potential for which 
appeared to recede with Ma’s first-term détente policies. Interest in Taiwan increased 
moderately since Ma’s re-election in 2012, but neither the Sunflower movement nor Tsai Ing-
wen’s election victory in 2016 raised attention levels to the earlier period when uncertainties 
and the potential for conflict in cross-Strait relations were arguably greater. One interpretation 
of this relative decline in interest, despite major political developments in Taiwan during the 
past decade, is that other global events, such as civil war in Syria and the increase in terrorist 
attacks, demand more column inches. Furthermore, the potential for a ‘newsworthy’ crisis in 
the Taiwan Strait has arguably declined since the missile crisis in 1995/6 and the uncertainties 
surrounding the first DPP administration at the beginning of the 2000s. In the intervening 
period, economic integration via trade and investment, and social interaction via the movement 
of people and various dialogue mechanisms have substantially reduced the possibility of 
military conflict. In this sense, a relative declining interest in Taiwan is a sign of the stability 
of cross-Strait relations.  
 
[Figure 1 here] 
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The next task is to measure the frequency of select terms appearing in the set of articles. 
Doing so illustrates the foreign media’s major preoccupations with Taiwan (see Figure 2). First 
and foremost, China is integral to western media coverage of Taiwan, to the extent that China 
is referenced in nearly 80% of headline articles about Taiwan. To a lesser extent, the US is also 
central to coverage of Taiwan, being present in nearly half of headline stories. The popular 
geopolitical frame used to deliver news on Taiwan is frequently ‘tension, crisis and conflict’—
which appears in nearly one third of articles. This is a noted feature of domestic and foreign 
news coverage generally (Cottle, 2006; Hoskins and O’Laughlin, 2010), and the result is that 
Taiwan is frequently portrayed as a site of conflict and tension with China. Worse still for 
Taipei, because China has been so effective in setting the frame of reference for understanding 
cross-Strait relations, Taiwan is sometimes portrayed as the source of conflict and tension. This 
may strike many Taiwanese as ironic, given that Beijing reserves the ‘right’ to use force against 
Taiwan and has 1800 missiles based in Fujian, and it is consistent with narratives in Chinese 
state media. The prevalence of references to ‘independence’ (in one quarter of all articles) 
indicate the major source of potential conflict, a frame that implicitly supports Beijing’s 
argument that the real status quo is ‘one China’ and that ‘independence’ is illegitimate and 
dangerous. The fact of Taiwan’s self-governing, functional autonomy is rarely noted, appearing 
in just over 1% of articles. The democratic achievements that Taiwanese are rightly proud of, 
and Taipei would like to emphasize as a defining part of its narrative, are mentioned in 11% of 
articles. Additionally, elections are mentioned in nearly one quarter of articles, although this 
form of domestic political competition is again often perceived through the lens of China, the 
US and the potential for conflict.  
 
[Figure 2 here] 
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The dominant association of Taiwan with China is consistent over the twenty years 
since the first direct election of the president (see Figure 3 below). The percentage of headline 
articles on Taiwan mentioning China ranges between 70% in 2002 and 84% in 2004 5, the year 
China passed its anti-secession law in response to Chen Shui-bian’s re-election. Unlike China, 
mentions of the US have declined over time, notably during the Ma era, reaching a low of one 
in three articles in 2014. From 1996 to 2008, mentions of the US tracked those of China, albeit 
at a lower level, reflecting the framing of Taiwan as a point of contention in Sino-US relations. 
As cross-Strait relations warmed under Ma, the potential for the US to become involved, or to 
involve itself, decreased, at least in the media construction of Taiwan stories. Figure 4 gives an 
indication of the division of labour in headline Taiwan stories, between conflictual and 
consensual relations reflected in the dichotomy of ‘tension’ and ‘trade’. Tension was the major 
story during the Lee and Chen eras (mentioned in nearly half of headline articles in 1996 and 
2004), giving way to trade under Ma. Spikes in stories on trade in 2010 accompanied the 
passing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement and the aborted Cross-Strait 
Service Trade Agreement which precipitated the Sunflower movement in 2014. In anticipation 
of Tsai Ing-wen’s victory in 2016, the proportion of headline articles on tension and trade 
converged, reflecting the international media’s understanding of the implications of a DPP 
victory for cross-Strait relations.    
 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
[Figure 4 here] 
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Reflecting the broader interest in conflict, ‘independence’, the pursuit of which Beijing 
explicitly equates with war, is much more frequently mentioned than ‘unification’. During the 
Chen era, ‘independence’ was mentioned in up to one in two headline articles, a preoccupation 
of the period that was not restricted to foreign media (Sullivan and Lowe, 2010). Under Ma, 
interest in ‘independence’ declined to 11% in 2013, rising substantially again in 2016 with 
Tsai’s victory, despite her steadfast message of adhering to the ‘status quo’. For much of the 
period after 2000, there has not been much foreign media interest in unification, which 
accurately reflects its declining salience in Taiwanese political discourse (Sullivan and Sapir, 
2013).  
 
[Figure 5 here] 
 
 
Coverage of Taiwan in New York Times and Washington Post 
The New York Times and Washington Post are American newspapers with elite audience 
demographics, superior resources and a reputation for nuanced political analysis. We anticipate 
that these factors may influence their coverage of Taiwan, specifically we suspect that coverage 
should be more nuanced than the diverse range of outlets analysed above. To test this 
assumption, we test whether contextual variables related to economic and political situation in 
Taiwan is reflected in coverage. Compared with the broader set of outlets, there is an obvious 
difference: the New York Times and Washington Post increased their coverage of Taiwan 
during the Ma era. Although there is substantial variation illustrative of periodic spikes in 
interest coinciding with major events like the Sunflower movement, the decision to cover 
Taiwan is not driven by elections to the same extent (see Figure 6).   
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[Figure 6 here] 
 
 
Having generated textual data as described above, we now seek to model the focus of 
coverage. In the models below, our dependent variable is the number of mentions of 'Taiwan' 
in each newspaper article. Our main independent variables are a count of references to nine 
conceptual categories in each newspaper article: 'U.S.', 'China', 'one China', 'status quo', 
'independence', 'tension', 'cooperation', 'democracy', and 'economy'. We then control for eight 
variables related to the political and economic context in Taiwan at the exact time that each 
article was published. First, we account for whether presidents are from the Kuomintang (KMT) 
or the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) by giving ideology ‘1’ if presidents are from the 
DPP, and ‘0’ otherwise. Second, we control for age of democracy, which is the number of years 
since Taiwan's democratic transition. Third, we include admin year as a control, which is the 
number of years since the president's inauguration. The fourth control variable, electoral cycle, 
measures the number of months left until the end of the president's current term of office. The 
fifth control variable, presidential popularity, is a measure of the incumbent president's 
popularity among the electorate. We use presidential approval ratings from monthly public 
opinion surveys conducted nationwide by TVBS.2 The variable, ranging from 0 to 1, is the 
aggregate proportion of respondents who answered ‘very satisfied’ and ‘somewhat satisfied’ 
to the following survey question: ‘How satisfied or dissatisfied you are in the performance of 
(a president's name)?’ The sixth control variable, legislative support, measures a president's 
partisan powers based on their ability to shape or dominate the policymaking process that 
emanates from the president's standing in relation to the party system (Shugart and Mainwaring, 
                                                          
2  http://other.tvbs.com.tw/other/poll-center/. The missing months were extrapolated from actual records of 
approval ratings. 
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1997). As a measure of a president's partisan strength, we employ the proportion of seats 
occupied by the president's party in the Legislative Yuan. We also account for inflation using 
the monthly change in the consumer price index as a proxy measure (following, for example, 
Martínez-Gallardo and Schleiter, 2015).3 Finally, we control for the total number of words in 
the newspaper article as it should be positively associated with our dependent variable (the 
number of mentions of Taiwan). Table 1 provides summary statistics for the independent and 
control variables included in the analysis.  
 
 
   [Table 1 here] 
 
 
 
Our sample includes significant variation in the number of mentions of ‘Taiwan’ in 
articles across and within administrations, thus we constructed models with fixed and random 
effects. This enables us to assess whether our independent variables predict differences not 
only across administrations but also within them. This modelling decision increases the 
robustness of our results by holding the administration context constant. To estimate the 
frequency of ‘Taiwan’ mentions we use Poisson regression models consistent with the 
distribution of the data. Table 2 sets out the estimated coefficients of our independent and 
control variables from the multivariate regression analysis. In the fixed effects models, Model 
1 examines our findings without controlling for the political and economic contexts of Taiwan, 
while Model 2 includes all these factors in the model specification. In the random effects 
models, Model 3 and 4, Model 3 includes independent variables only, while Model 4 accounts 
for all contextual variables. Since the coefficients from the Poisson models in Table 2 are not 
                                                          
3 https://www.ceicdata.com/en/statistics/Consumer-Price-Index-CPI. 
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straightforward to interpret, we estimate the predicted probabilities of an increase from the 
observed mean to the maximum values for independent variables that attained statistical 
significance. 
 
      [Table 2 here] 
 
 
The systematic analysis set out in Table 2 largely confirms that New York Times and 
Washington Post coverage is formulated in similar ways to the 65 outlets covered in the broader 
document set. With a high degree of confidence, we can say that mentions of Taiwan are 
statistically associated with indicators representing the categories 'China', 'U.S.', 'one China', 
'independence', 'tension', and 'economy'. Taiwan is less likely to be mentioned in relation to 
indicators of ‘cooperation’. In Model 2, the estimated coefficients of the former group of terms 
are positive and statistically significant, but the coefficient of ‘cooperation’ is negative and 
statistically significant. The substantive effects of these variables on the frequency of ‘Taiwan’ 
mentions in New York Times and Washington Post articles are as follows: for an increase from 
their observed mean to their maximum values, there is an expected increase of 27.2 times ('one 
China'), 18.4 times ('independence'), 13 times ('economy'), 11 times ('tension'), 9.3 times 
('China') and 7.5 times ('U.S.'), holding all other variables constant. For terms associated with 
‘cooperation’ there is an expected decrease of 16.2 times. We did not find a statistically 
significant relationship between ‘Taiwan’ and terms relating to ‘the status quo’ or ‘democracy’. 
Several control variables relating to the political and economic context in Taiwan reached 
statistical significance. In Model 2, for instance, we find that the effects of ideology and admin 
year are negative and statistically significant. Thus, Taiwan tends to be mentioned less under 
DPP governments than during KMT administrations, and less towards the end of the 
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president’s current term than in their first year in office. Figure 7 demonstrates the marginal 
effect of indicators representing the conceptual categories as well as contextual variables on 
the predicted frequency of mentions of Taiwan in the New York Times and Washington Post 
articles. The horizontal axis for each plot indicates observed values of continuous variables that 
are statistically significant in Model 2, and the vertical axis indicates the frequency of mentions 
of Taiwan. Figure 7 showing the marginal effect of indicators representing categories and 
contexts and the predicted frequency of mentions of Taiwan clearly illustrates the positive or 
negative associations across different indicators and variables. 
 
[Figure 7 here]  
 
 
Foreign Media Narratives and Taiwan’s Public Diplomacy Program 
Due to the complexities and ambiguities of its status, and Beijing’s proactive efforts to 
determine global understandings of Taiwan’s status, establishing Taiwan’s ‘national brand’ is 
hindered by marginalisation in international society, including an international knowledge 
deficit. Our analysis of foreign media coverage of Taiwan over the past two decades suggest 
that the narratives being communicated to foreign audiences are also inconsistent with the 
emphases that Taipei would like. The PRC’s economic and diplomatic strengths, and its 
strategic advantages in many other spheres including increasing attempt to influence foreign 
media, have helped Beijing establish ‘one China’ as policy for most states in the world. 
However, through the promotion of Taiwan as a stable and open democracy, with a diverse and 
progressive society committed to liberal values, Taiwan has the potential to generate a ‘soft 
power’ repertoire as a bulwark against Chinese pressures to increase Taiwan’s marginalization 
and to generate popular support for Taiwan’s participation in international society. These are 
the tasks of external communications and public diplomacy programs, since ‘attraction requires 
21 
 
the effective use of global communication to persuade public opinion around the world to 
support one’s causes’ (Gilboa, 2002: 731). In this competition, Beijing has outperformed Taipei. 
Once the PRC’s economic reforms bore fruit, Beijing adopted a program of ‘soft power’ 
initiatives in response to negative reactions to its rising economic power and intensifying global 
engagement (Ding, 2008; Li, 2008). Taiwan only developed a ‘soft power’ repertoire only after 
China introduced the idea of ‘comprehensive national power’ in the mid-1990s (Wang and Lu, 
2008: 426). Despite its attraction for policymakers, the connection between ‘soft power’ 
initiatives and the capacity to influence public opinion and behaviour has yet to be definitively 
established (Xie and Page, 2013). The results of China’s ‘soft power’ programs have been 
incommensurate with government expectations and the level of investment. Beijing’s huge 
investment in tools designed to generate soft power (international TV channels, Confucius 
Institutes etc.) have not won hearts and minds in Taiwan nor much of the developed world 
(Hartig, 2015; Sun, 2009; Zhang, 2010).4 China’s increasing economic and political influence 
continue to feed into discourses readily taken up by nations concerned for the implications of 
a ‘rising China’, in terms of a purported ‘China threat’ (Broomfield, 2003; Roy, 1996), a 
Chinese ‘grand strategy’ (Johnston, 1995; Swaine et al., 2000), and Chinese nationalism (Deng, 
2008; Gries, 2005). Images of China in foreign media have been constructed using multiple 
negative frames that seek to establish China as ‘different’ and a ‘threat’ (Sullivan and Renz, 
2011; Yang and Liu, 2012). With its authoritarian political system and ‘rational’ foreign policy, 
China is often portrayed as operating in a different moral universe to western democratic 
countries (Mawdsley, 2008), while the idea of a ‘rising China’ and ‘China threat’ have become 
common reference points in the media, public opinion surveys and political discourses (Stone 
                                                          
4 The return on China’s soft power initiatives in the developing world appear to be greater, although there remains 
difficulty in disentangling cause and effect and the refraction of economic power (Hartig, 2012; Kurlantzick, 2007) 
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and Xiao, 2007; Yang and Liu, 2012). Notwithstanding the PRC’s many advantages in other 
spheres, in terms of ‘soft power’ resources Taiwan appears relatively well endowed.  
After peaceful and consolidated democratization processes, Taiwan possesses the base 
materials to construct a narrative invoking liberal values, commitment to democracy, human 
rights, rule of law and good governance. In these areas, the juxtaposition with the PRC is 
obvious. Taiwan has numerous potential sources of ‘attraction’, from traditional Chinese 
culture and a hybrid distinctly Taiwanese culture, to liberal creative and media sectors and a 
dynamic civil society. As a successful former newly industrialized economy, Taiwan’s 
economic achievements and reputation for cutting edge high-tech manufacturing and 
innovation, global trade and investment, substantial international aid programs and high 
standards of living, are a major ‘soft power’ resource. However, there is an obvious mismatch 
between Taiwan’s attractive values and its gains in international society, including basic 
knowledge about what Taiwan is. While it is the PRC’s ‘hard power’ that is largely responsible 
for Taiwan being ‘financially rich, diplomatically poor’ (Chan, 1997: 37), Taipei’s own efforts 
to project its own narrative internationally are also culpable to some extent.  
Over the past two decades Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Government 
Information Office, Council for Cultural Affairs and the Mainland Affairs Council have tended 
to focus on initiatives serving domestic political aims rather than generating soft power appeals 
abroad, indicating the lack of consensus in Taiwan about what Taiwan is and how to present 
itself (Rawnsley, 2012). Aid programs and the activities of NGOs like Tzu Chi, which often 
are more credible sources of ‘organic soft power’, have generated positive reactions, although 
outcomes associated with initiatives like Chen Shui-bian’s ‘peoples’ diplomacy’, are less clear. 
Taiwan’s use of soft power instruments has been ‘overwhelmingly defensive, focused on 
implications for relations with the mainland and concerned with sustaining US backing to offset 
or deter pressure from Beijing’ (DeLisle, 2010: 511). Such a focus is understandable given the 
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political constraints within which Taiwan must operate, but this reactive strategy restricts 
Taiwan to the parameters set by Beijing (and followed by foreign media), namely to talk about 
Taiwan is necessarily to talk about China. Taiwan’s external communications have failed to 
help it ‘transit from the invisible to the visible’, negating the projection of its ‘soft power’ 
potential, which ‘depends on others seeing, recognizing, and responding’ to Taiwan’s attractive 
qualities (Rawnsley, 2017: 3).  
Taiwan’s efforts to increase awareness and knowledge, and to establish its own 
narrative through lobbying, the activities of trade and cultural offices, people exchanges and 
public diplomacy continue to be important. Given that ‘soft power depends on others’ 
knowledge of one’s alluring qualities’ (Mattern, 2005: 588), it is crucial that Taiwan continue 
its program of activities in this sphere. But, as Rawnsley argues, Taiwan needs a ‘more holistic 
approach [which] may involve telling a political and social as much as a cultural story’ (2012: 
131). Because of the restrictions placed on Taiwan by Beijing, the relatively safe topic of 
culture has been a major vehicle for Taiwan’s external communications. Under Ma the 
emphasis was on traditional Chinese culture, which added confusion to what Taiwan is and 
how it portrays itself to the world. Furthermore, culture in the sense of exhibitions and 
exchanges is rarely ‘newsworthy’, and these efforts rarely gain any traction in the foreign media. 
In order to have more forceful public diplomatic engagement, and to address the issue of geo-
political framing that tends to burnish Beijing’s preferred understanding of the status quo, 
Taipei needs to consider ways to tell its story in a more multidimensional way, moving beyond 
culture alone. Taiwan is endowed with an abundance of material for creating a compelling 
national narrative, based on its history, diversity and dynamic economy, politics and society. 
As Rawnsley and others have argued, these base materials have not been fully leveraged, in 
part because there has been a degree of confusion about what Taipei wants to achieve with its 
public diplomacy programs. In a crowded global information environment where the PRC is 
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investing heavily in political communications of all kinds, Taipei requires a holistic strategy to 
raise awareness of Taiwan and to more strongly influence the narrative that is told about it 
globally. Currently, Taipei doesn’t have an effective international media strategy, while Beijing 
invests heavily in its own international media, not only CCTV international operations but 
websites like Sixth Tone which publishes stories in English by native speaking journalists that 
often paint China in an unflattering but ‘humanizing’ way. Taipei meanwhile relies on stale 
and formal communications published in outlets like Taiwan Today, or cultural brochures. 
There is institutional confusion since the abolition of the Government Information Office as 
part of streamlining of the Executive Yuan and the transfer of its responsibilities to Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the new Ministry of Culture. A slow moving and conservative bureaucracy 
is unable to keep up with fast moving news and communications means that narratives are 
shaped long before governments and foreign ministries have agreed and approved a reaction. 
President Tsai has recently begun Tweeting (in English and Japanese), which is a promising 
development.   
 
Conclusion 
In this article we have demonstrated that western newspaper coverage of Taiwan is dominated 
by a focus on geopolitics and popular geopolitical framings, situating Taiwan within the 
context of cross-Strait relations and the broader regional political environment structured by 
Sino-US relations. Entrenched framing strategies frequently connect Taiwan to ‘tensions’ in 
the Strait, reinforcing Beijing’s rhetorical position where the PRC’s sovereignty claim is 
juxtaposed with subtly destabilizing forces within and emanating out of Taiwanese domestic 
politics. This is evident in depictions of the pursuit of ‘independence’, notwithstanding the 
almost complete marginalisation of this position in Taiwan itself. Over the course of Taiwan’s 
democratic era, some of these framings appear to have ossified as part of a ‘hegemonic regime 
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of representation’ (Mawdsley, 2008: 510), ironically mirroring treatment of the PRC itself, 
which has been cast as an ideological competitor to the west and is often framed by ill-informed 
media stereotypes (Sautman and Yan, 2009; Sullivan and Renz, 2012). This is partly due to the 
structure of geo-politics and partly down to the way the media itself works. In consequence, 
the image of Taiwan as it is frequently conveyed to western audiences is of a geopolitical 
hotspot, a participant, or worse, an instigator of a potential security crisis. This crude portrayal 
does a disservice to Taiwan and is an impediment to creating a multidimensional, nuanced 
narrative about the Taiwanese ‘national story’. Lack of knowledge about Taiwan among 
western publics creates a vicious cycle whereby news coverage is pitched at a less sophisticated 
level, ossifying digestible cues like ‘independence seeking’, ‘renegade province’ or ‘tensions’ 
that compound misunderstandings about Taiwan. The implications for Taiwan’s national 
image and the success of its ‘soft power’ and public diplomacy programs are profound, at a 
time when the PRC is investing heavily in externally facing media operations and increasing 
its influence in the global media-sphere. The dominant ‘China lens’ (including Sino-US 
relations) in coverage of Taiwan is an obvious obstacle to the dissemination of a distinctly 
Taiwanese narrative, and demands a proactive, organized and holistic communications strategy 
to address it.   
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